WEBVTT
Kind: captions
Language: en-US

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[silence]

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Okay, well, I can see we just hit
one minute after the hour, so I’m

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going to go ahead and get started.
My name is Matt Thomas,

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and thank you for joining the
USGS Landslide Hazards seminar.

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This meeting is hosted by the Landslide
Hazards Program at the USGS and is

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co-organized with contributions from
Stephen Slaughter and Jaime Kostelnik.

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And, for folks that are new to this
meeting, you have the ability to submit

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questions via the chat window or
to use the raise-your-hand feature

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in combination with your
microphone and video camera.

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We’re going to wait until the end
of the presentation to take questions,

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so you feel free to type them in the
chat window, but in the meantime,

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if you’re not intending to speak,
just please keep your

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microphone muted
and your video camera off.

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Mark, I’m going to go ahead and turn
it over to you to introduce Brian.

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- Thanks, Matt. My name’s Mark Reid.
I’m with the USGS Landslide Hazards

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Program, and it’s my pleasure
to introduce Brian Collins,

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who is also with the USGS
Landslide Hazards Program.

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Brian is both a geologist and
a geotechnical engineer, so he wears

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both hats. He keeps his professional
engineering credential going as well.

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Brian did his undergrad at Purdue,
his master’s at CU-Boulder, and

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a Ph.D. in geotechnical engineering
from UC-Berkeley with Nick Sitar.

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He started with the USGS as a
Mendenhall postdoc, and he’s been here

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about 16 years out here in Menlo Park
and Moffett Field in California.

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He’s done considerable work on rock
fracture mechanics, rockfall hazard and

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risk, rainfall-induced shallow landslides,
ground-based remote sensing systems,

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such as Lidar and radar.
So quite a spread of activities.

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And he’s worked with the
National Park Service in Yosemite.

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He’s working in Alaska,
Prince William Sound,

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and the San Francisco Bay Area,
so a lot of different areas.

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But he’s participated in numerous
landslide crises responses over the years,

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and that’s an important element of the
USGS Landslide Hazards Program.

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The style and nature of these responses
have evolved over the years,

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and Brian will be talking about
some of that evolution today.

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So welcome, Brian.

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- All right. Thanks very much, Mark.
That was a really nice introduction.

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I appreciate that.

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And it’s my pleasure to
be able to present on this topic.

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This is something that I think a lot of us,
if not all of us, have touched upon

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at some point in our careers
with landslide science.

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I do want to thank the conveners
for this, in particular, Matt.

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I think the seminar has just been
great over the past two years,

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and so kudos to all of you
for organizing that.

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And also, before I begin, I want to
thank the co-authors that you see here.

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This is very much
a group effort.

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As Mark mentioned,
I’ve been here for 16 years.

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I’m going to summarize 20 years of
USGS response to landslide disasters,

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so a compilation of a lot of people
and a lot of experiences went into this,

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so thanks to
all of them.

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So, as we all know, landslide
disasters occur worldwide.

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And, you know, they’re not –
that’s not going to change.

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Society continues to develop
into steeper areas.

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There’s climate change
effects that we’ll be needing to

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take into
consideration.

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And so essentially, at some point
in the future, there will be another

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landslide disaster.
And so it’s our responsibility as

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landslide experts to be able to be
positioned and to have the expertise to

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be able to respond when emergency
workers ask for our assistance.

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Those emergency workers are typically
the first people on the scene –

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firefighters, police officers.
And they’re not landslide experts.

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They may not know exactly
what they’re dealing with.

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On the other hand, we obviously have
that background, but we don’t work

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in that emergency realm all the time.
And so there’s that – there’s that point

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where we have to really start to
communicate, and communication

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is really a key in responding
to landslide disasters.

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You’ll see I’ll mention that several
times throughout the talk about

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how we go about doing that.
So the questions here, and the

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motivation for putting this talk together
has really come down to, what do

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landslide experts – what can they do?
How can they share their knowledge?

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And what are the best practices
for landslide disaster response?

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So this presentation was actually
put together for an invited keynote talk

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at the World Landslide Forum
in Kyoto, Japan, last year,

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presented online.

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And there, I had the opportunity to
sort of bring all these experiences,

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bring all these different responses
that the USGS had been involved

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with and queried a lot of different
people and tried to develop that, tried to

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get these best practices down on paper.
And so what I’ll do today is I’ll share

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some examples and case studies from
that trying to wrap our heads around

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what we do in landslide disaster
response and what we’ve learned

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and how best
to go about it.

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So first a quick note about,
what is a landslide disaster.

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I define it here very broadly.
It’s something that causes undesired

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and devastating societal outcomes.
And that’s very broad, but you can see

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that the last slide that I showed had
a big dust cloud coming from a rockfall.

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That’s affecting infrastructure.
And, for those emergency managers,

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for those land managers,
that is a disaster to them.

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There may be fatalities.
There might be injuries.

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There’s definitely going to
be property damage.

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And so that’s what
they’re dealing with.

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Compare that to this slide here, the Santa
Tecla, El Salvador, landslide in 2001.

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You know, killed many people,
destroyed many homes.

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That is also a disaster.
Obviously a different flavor.

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But these are responses,
and where we have to provide

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that expertise in
each of these situations.

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So, to begin, I’m going to start
with two quick examples of

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just what it is that we do.
I’m going to use two examples that

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I’m familiar with personally,
responses that I worked on, just to

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sort of paint a picture of the type of
things that we do when we’re

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on the ground, when we’re talking
to emergency responders.

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And then I’ll go into some background
about the factors that affect responses

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and the types of landslide responses.
And the types I’ve categorized in terms of

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the timeframe that we’re viewing them.
I’ll go into more detail about this in

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a bit, but essentially looking at and
compartmentalizing the case studies

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into looking towards the past,
what we can learn from the past,

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dealing with the present, the hazard
situation that’s affecting us now,

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and then the third is looking toward
the future and saying, what can we

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learn from the situation now to help us
prepare for future events or potentially

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prevent future events
from happening.

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And so then I’ll just end with
a quick summary of progress

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and a couple conclusions that
we can draw from all this.

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Before I get into some of these details,
I do want to say that, you know,

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this talk is not meant to come
across as definitive, or, you know,

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this is how the USGS does it,
and all of you should do it too.

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That’s not at
all the intent.

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Rather, this is really put together
as an invitation to the landslide

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response community. I know that
we all deal with this in some ways.

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States have to deal with this all the time,
whether it’s a state Geological Survey

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or a Department of Transportation
or some other agency.

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I’m painting this picture
from the USGS perspective.

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Because we’ve been doing it
for a long time, but it’s certainly

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just one perspective.
So there’s also lots of other needs

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that might be taken, and I’m sure
the international community,

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different countries have
different ways to go about this.

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That all said, in looking through
all the case studies that we’ve responded

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to in the USGS, I did find broad
similarities, at least in terms of

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what we do and what we’ve learned.
And so, as I mentioned, it’s an invitation

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to start these conversations before
that next disaster strikes so that

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we’re prepared and we
can learn from one another.

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What do we do in a
landslide disaster response?

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It’s fairly simple,
and it’s communication.

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We’re providing technical
information for decision-makers.

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We’re typically not making decisions.
Those are left to those emergency

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personnel that have to coalesce
a lot of different information and

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then decide what’s best for that
particular situation for the community.

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And so really, what we’re doing is
we’re helping those decision-makers

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understand the hazard – the landslide
hazard so that they can make informed

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decisions. So, for example – and I’ll
go into some of these details with

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some of the case studies, but if
an emergency manager needs to

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know what the likelihood of something
else coming down onto the road,

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and we say there’s a medium likelihood,
or a high likelihood or something

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like that, that doesn’t necessarily mean
that they’re going to close the road.

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They have other considerations
that they may need to account for,

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such as that road is the only
emergency transport lane to get some

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injuries out or something like that.
So, you know, we don’t

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have all the facts.
Our job is to really provide the

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hazard facts to them so that
they can make those decisions.

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So let me start with these two quick
examples that I’ve been involved in.

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These are both from California.
One’s in the Bay Area.

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There was a debris flow in Sausalito, a
small community, that led to one injury.

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And then I’ll highlight some
experiences from Yosemite.

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Here this is a rockfall that
led to a fatality and to injuries.

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And so I’m not going to go
into full details on these,

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I just want to sort of paint a picture
and just showcase what a –

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what a response looks like,
what’s done.

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So this is Sausalito.
As I mentioned, small community

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in the San Francisco Bay Area.
It’s densely populated and built

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on very steep hillsides with
a history of previous landsliding.

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This particular event happened during
a fairly large significant rainstorm.

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It was about 1,200
cubic meters in volume.

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And it destroyed several homes.
You can see here in the image

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on the right some of these
homes built on stilts –

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as I mentioned,
very steep terrain.

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It blocked roads, ruptured a gas pipeline,
tore apart some electrical lines.

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There was one injury. Somebody
was in the upper level of

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one of the houses
and actually slid down.

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And the rescue workers were the first
ones – the fire department were the

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first ones on the scene to pull
that person from the wreckage.

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What did I do in this?
Well, the first thing I needed to do –

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so I have a project in the San Francisco
Bay Area. We study landslides.

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I have knowledge of this, and so I –
this was sort of right next door,

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or in the region of our offices, and
so I extended my efforts to them.

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And the first thing to do is basically
make connection with the emergency

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managers. You know, there was
no landslide expert at the scene

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when I arrived, and so I had to introduce
myself as such and say, I’m with the

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USGS. I have landslide expertise.
Would this be helpful?

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You know, do you know
what you’re dealing with here?

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That’s going to be typically welcomed.
I mean, people are very [chuckles] –

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very welcoming when
you’re offering help.

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Obviously, it’s a very stressful situation,
and finding the right person to

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talk to might take some time.
Once that was done, the first thing they

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really wanted to know was, you know,
what’s the potential for additional

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landslide movement? And so
evaluating secondary landslides,

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looking at the head scarp, looking
for tension cracks, trying to make

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those sort of observations and passing on
those observations, our landslide

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expert trained eyes can maybe
see things that other people don’t.

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And so passing on that
information was critical.

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Providing some context
on previous landsliding.

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You know, landslides in this community
have occurred, but they’re more like

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a decadal type thing, and so there
wasn’t really any institutional

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knowledge of previous landslides
in this area that the emergency workers

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were familiar with. And so letting
them know, yeah, there have

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been landslides before. They’ve been
destructive. This is similar to that.

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That just helps people have some
information rather than thinking this

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is the first time this has ever
happened, and what do we do.

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One interesting thing was to share
information on clean-up protocol.

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So this was 2019.
USGS had just been involved in Oso,

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a Washington landslide, in 2014.
And, you know, in the subsequent

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days following this event,
there were questions about, okay,

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how do we go about cleaning this up?
And I said, well, let me put you in touch

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with some partners in Washington
state that actually just had to do this.

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There’s communities up there that just
had to, you know, deal with hazardous

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waste situations in the landslide debris
and clean-up and things like that.

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And I think that can be very helpful
to have, again, our experiences,

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our connections, extended
and bridging those relationships.

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So what does this all come down to?
Providing answers to the first

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responders and the local managers.
What can happen next?

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Is it safe for rescue workers?
You know, recommending spotters,

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for example, before people
go into the debris to start

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looking for additional
fatalities or injuries.

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Providing suggestions and at least
some comments on mitigation

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measures that they might want to
take prior to the next storm.

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That’s the kind of information
that we provide – we can provide

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from the landslide
expert perspective.

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Next case study – or, next example,
again, just to go through some

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of the things that we do when we’re
responding to these types of events.

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Here are some rockfalls that occurred
in 2017 in Yosemite National Park.

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Yosemite is visited by
millions of people per year.

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For those that haven’t been, there’s
extremely steep granitic rock cliffs.

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They’re prone to rockfall periodically.
And, in this case, there was about a

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300-cubic-meter rockfall that
fell off of the southeast face

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of El Capitan, shown here.
And, unfortunately, there was

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one fatality and a injury.
These were climbers that were

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planning to climb one of –
one of the routes on El Cap.

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I was not there for the immediate
response. The park geologist was.

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And so there’s a whole nother story
to be told for that, but I can say that,

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immediately, the search-and-rescue
people that were trying to get the

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injured person out and evaluate the
extent of the other person’s injuries,

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you know, that’s decision-making
on the spot as well.

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What’s the likelihood for additional
rockfall? How quickly can we do this?

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And so obviously somebody
who’s familiar with rockfalls,

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like a park geologist, can provide
that information on the spot.

00:15:41.280 --> 00:15:45.200
A day later, there was a much larger
rockfall, about 10,000 cubic meters,

00:15:45.200 --> 00:15:50.000
that came down. And that’s what
you’re seeing here in the picture.

00:15:50.000 --> 00:15:52.800
And there was an additional injury.
There was a piece of flyrock,

00:15:52.800 --> 00:15:56.616
basically a piece of debris that
flew up and over the trees

00:15:56.640 --> 00:16:00.376
and hit somebody driving
down one of the roads.

00:16:00.400 --> 00:16:05.176
That led to very large dust cloud,
obviously, and the closure of the road.

00:16:05.200 --> 00:16:08.776
And so that’s when I was called in
to provide some assistance.

00:16:08.800 --> 00:16:12.480
And, again, you know, what are the
questions that are going to be asked,

00:16:12.480 --> 00:16:18.856
and what can we do? Well, what’s
the potential for additional rockfall?

00:16:18.880 --> 00:16:22.720
That’s a key question. Can we – you
know, should we keep the road closed?

00:16:22.720 --> 00:16:26.240
Can it be opened safely?
What can you tell us?

00:16:26.240 --> 00:16:29.920
And so things that we did in this case
is we assessed the source area

00:16:29.920 --> 00:16:33.096
for additional instability.
We’re using spotting scopes.

00:16:33.120 --> 00:16:37.440
There was a helicopter available
in the early part of the response to

00:16:37.440 --> 00:16:43.176
get very detailed photos
and eyes into that source area.

00:16:43.200 --> 00:16:49.336
We analyzed both archived –
so we had pre-event Lidar data,

00:16:49.360 --> 00:16:52.400
and then we created models
with structure-from-motion

00:16:52.400 --> 00:16:55.280
from photographs taken from
the helicopter and from the ground

00:16:55.280 --> 00:16:59.176
to assess the volume of
the next possible instability.

00:16:59.200 --> 00:17:02.080
And this was a really
interesting case study.

00:17:02.080 --> 00:17:05.256
We worked with colleagues
in Switzerland.

00:17:05.280 --> 00:17:09.976
We were collecting the data.
They were processing the SfM models

00:17:10.000 --> 00:17:13.360
while we were sleeping.
And so, in the course of 24 hours,

00:17:13.360 --> 00:17:15.520
because we were working with
colleagues in different time zones,

00:17:15.520 --> 00:17:20.216
we were actually able to really quite
efficiently get to some of these answers.

00:17:20.240 --> 00:17:23.760
And so estimating what that next
volume might be that comes down –

00:17:23.760 --> 00:17:26.800
is it larger or smaller than
what’s already come down?

00:17:26.800 --> 00:17:31.440
What the likelihood that it’s
going to continue past the distance

00:17:31.440 --> 00:17:34.776
of the previous
rockfall or not?

00:17:34.800 --> 00:17:39.600
And so providing those sorts of answers,
putting the event in context with

00:17:39.600 --> 00:17:43.520
previously recorded rockfalls, what’s
the history of rockfall from this cliff?

00:17:43.520 --> 00:17:49.200
Have there been others lately?
And, again, same questions here.

00:17:49.200 --> 00:17:52.800
We’re providing answers to the first
responders and the local managers

00:17:52.800 --> 00:17:56.800
we’re responding – we’re providing
answers to those questions.

00:17:56.800 --> 00:17:59.416
What could trigger
additional motion?

00:17:59.440 --> 00:18:04.225
And, you know, how big and how
far might an additional rockfall go?

00:18:05.040 --> 00:18:11.440
So I hope those two examples sort of
give at least some portrayal of the things

00:18:11.440 --> 00:18:17.896
we do, the questions we’re asked,
the types of data that we can gather.

00:18:17.920 --> 00:18:23.200
We’ll revisit three case studies here in
a bit and go into a little bit more detail

00:18:23.200 --> 00:18:26.776
about some of the lessons learned from
those, but before I do that, I did want to

00:18:26.800 --> 00:18:30.400
briefly discuss some of the factors
that affect landslide response.

00:18:30.400 --> 00:18:33.600
And I’ve organized those here
according to six different categories,

00:18:33.600 --> 00:18:37.656
and we’ll step through
each one of these.

00:18:37.680 --> 00:18:42.960
In terms of the mechanism and type,
obviously the type of landslide,

00:18:42.960 --> 00:18:47.896
what it is is going to determine
what sort of expertise is needed.

00:18:47.920 --> 00:18:53.360
So I’ll say, you know, is it a natural or
anthropogenic trigger, for example?

00:18:53.360 --> 00:18:58.000
If it’s anthropogenic, if it’s, you know,
some construction was cutting the slope,

00:18:58.000 --> 00:18:59.840
then obviously those are the
people we’re going to want to

00:18:59.840 --> 00:19:02.936
talk to to understand
the stability conditions.

00:19:02.960 --> 00:19:06.776
If it’s a rockfall versus a debris flow,
it’s very different expertise.

00:19:06.800 --> 00:19:11.520
You’re going to want to tap into the
right people that have that expertise –

00:19:11.520 --> 00:19:14.376
hydrology,
fracture mechanics.

00:19:14.400 --> 00:19:19.256
Experience with these
events will be critical.

00:19:19.280 --> 00:19:24.800
And then obviously the type of
landslide will determine what you do,

00:19:24.800 --> 00:19:30.960
if any, in terms of monitoring.
So will there be some kind of repeat

00:19:30.960 --> 00:19:38.480
Lidar or GPS tracking or in situ
instrumentation to monitor potential

00:19:38.480 --> 00:19:42.720
other movement from the slide?
So the mechanism and the type are

00:19:42.720 --> 00:19:48.376
critical. That’s an important factor for
determining what you do in a response.

00:19:48.400 --> 00:19:52.720
The number and the geographic extent,
obviously, are another important factor

00:19:52.720 --> 00:19:56.536
here. Is there one landslide we’re
dealing with or thousands?

00:19:56.560 --> 00:20:01.760
And if it’s many, and if it covers
a large geographic area, then we

00:20:01.760 --> 00:20:04.640
have to be open to the fact that we
might be dealing with a lot of different

00:20:04.640 --> 00:20:09.096
emergency managers. We might be
dealing with different municipalities.

00:20:09.120 --> 00:20:12.320
In the case of an earthquake that spans
a large area, might be working with

00:20:12.320 --> 00:20:17.452
different even state governments
or regional governments.

00:20:18.400 --> 00:20:21.120
In this case, you know, when we’re
dealing with thousands of landslides,

00:20:21.120 --> 00:20:28.776
it’s really a triage discussion of,
we have limited resources,

00:20:28.800 --> 00:20:33.440
what can we do with those resources,
and where best to dedicate them.

00:20:33.440 --> 00:20:38.616
They’ll be hard decisions here.
We obviously can’t do everything,

00:20:38.640 --> 00:20:43.700
and so we’re going to have to do our
best to say, here’s what we can provide.

00:20:45.753 --> 00:20:49.095
[silence]

00:20:49.120 --> 00:20:53.600
The size of the landslide will obviously
also affect the type of the response.

00:20:53.600 --> 00:20:59.976
The scale of the disaster,
scales are obviously – is related to

00:21:00.000 --> 00:21:04.560
landslide runout, in many cases.
Are there multiple types of

00:21:04.560 --> 00:21:06.720
landsliding from
a larger landslide?

00:21:06.720 --> 00:21:11.096
So this is the Oso, Washington,
landslide in 2014.

00:21:11.120 --> 00:21:14.480
This had a debris flow off the front,
a rotational back scarp,

00:21:14.480 --> 00:21:19.520
all sorts of things in between.
And so a large landslide like this

00:21:19.520 --> 00:21:24.136
might require, again, lots of
different types of experts here.

00:21:24.160 --> 00:21:27.120
Hydrologists are going to be need to
brought in to understand what the

00:21:27.120 --> 00:21:32.640
flooding hazards might be or the
dam breach hazards associated

00:21:32.640 --> 00:21:36.936
with a landslide blocking a river,
which is what happened here.

00:21:36.960 --> 00:21:41.680
And also a very large landslide might
block your transportation routes in

00:21:41.680 --> 00:21:46.640
and out. And so access from multiple
directions might be necessary.

00:21:46.640 --> 00:21:50.880
And, again, Oso provides a really –
a good example of that.

00:21:50.880 --> 00:21:54.560
You can see here the landslide’s
blocking the road, and so emergency

00:21:54.560 --> 00:21:58.320
crews had to come in from this direction
and this direction, and those lines of

00:21:58.320 --> 00:22:03.840
communications weren’t exactly
easy to make in the early stages.

00:22:03.840 --> 00:22:08.000
And so that will obviously affect
the type of response or how you

00:22:08.000 --> 00:22:12.160
go about organizing the response.
If you’re providing expertise to people

00:22:12.160 --> 00:22:17.340
on this side, hopefully you have
a means to do it on this side as well.

00:22:18.000 --> 00:22:20.960
The potential for continued activity –
you know, this is critical.

00:22:20.960 --> 00:22:23.680
This is one of the questions that
obviously emergency managers are

00:22:23.680 --> 00:22:27.896
going to ask of landslide experts.
What’s the potential?

00:22:27.920 --> 00:22:33.280
Is it – is this a stable situation,
or is it continued to be unstable?

00:22:33.280 --> 00:22:38.456
What’s going to happen next?
How quickly can we get our emergency

00:22:38.480 --> 00:22:43.656
personnel – our search-and-rescue
crews in to do what they need to do?

00:22:43.680 --> 00:22:47.360
What are we looking at?
And so you can obviously imagine that,

00:22:47.360 --> 00:22:51.120
in the case of an earthquake, we have
aftershocks, and so there is that

00:22:51.120 --> 00:22:56.776
potential. That might not be the case for
other types of landslides, for example.

00:22:56.800 --> 00:23:01.200
I have highlighted here this really
interesting landslide from the Gorkha,

00:23:01.200 --> 00:23:07.600
Nepal, earthquake in 2015, which had
some unfortunate circumstances.

00:23:07.600 --> 00:23:13.040
So I was part of a team that evaluated
this landslide, and in the immediate

00:23:13.040 --> 00:23:17.896
short term, we determined that the risk
from additional landsliding was low.

00:23:17.920 --> 00:23:22.560
That, you know, there weren’t any other
tension cracks or back scarps forming.

00:23:22.560 --> 00:23:24.720
There’s probably going to
be a lot of rockfall.

00:23:24.720 --> 00:23:30.056
The people in the village were, you
know, told to stay away from this area.

00:23:30.080 --> 00:23:34.880
Unfortunately, in the longer term,
monsoon rains came and re-activated a

00:23:34.880 --> 00:23:38.720
lot of this debris and led to additional
destruction and a fatality in the village.

00:23:38.720 --> 00:23:42.000
And so, when we – when we consider,
what’s that question, potential for

00:23:42.000 --> 00:23:47.360
continued activity, sometimes that
timeline extends longer than the

00:23:47.360 --> 00:23:52.000
immediate part of the hazard that
we’re trying to wrap our heads around.

00:23:52.000 --> 00:23:57.732
We have to be thinking
a lot longer in some cases.

00:23:59.360 --> 00:24:05.416
The location obviously will depend –
or, the type of response will depend on

00:24:05.440 --> 00:24:10.320
how easily you can get to the location.
So has the landslide occurred in a urban

00:24:10.320 --> 00:24:13.280
environment where you can drive there,
or is it remote and you will be

00:24:13.280 --> 00:24:21.360
using helicopters? How easily and
efficient can we respond and get the

00:24:21.360 --> 00:24:27.416
people who need to help with the
response, how quickly can that occur?

00:24:27.440 --> 00:24:30.400
What type of monitoring methods
can we effectively use if it’s in

00:24:30.400 --> 00:24:34.560
a remote setting? And I note that,
you know, there’s a number of really

00:24:34.560 --> 00:24:38.000
great technologies that have come –
that have been developed over the

00:24:38.000 --> 00:24:43.760
past 10 years, or longer, in some cases.
But the use of remote satellite

00:24:43.760 --> 00:24:48.296
imagery is great. We can learn a lot
before even getting onto the ground.

00:24:48.320 --> 00:24:54.160
Obviously, satellite, radar,
the use of drones, these are all

00:24:54.160 --> 00:25:01.349
critical tools that can help working
in especially remote locations.

00:25:01.920 --> 00:25:05.440
And then the final aspect that
affects the type of response you’ll do

00:25:05.440 --> 00:25:09.120
is the cultural setting.
We have to keep in mind that

00:25:09.120 --> 00:25:13.496
responses are requests for assistance.
We’re providing our expertise.

00:25:13.520 --> 00:25:17.336
And we have to be sensitive to
what the needs of the community are.

00:25:17.360 --> 00:25:20.720
In addition, you know, for obviously
an international response,

00:25:20.720 --> 00:25:24.320
there’s lot of logistical hurdles.
There’s permissions, visas,

00:25:24.320 --> 00:25:25.840
language barriers,
and things like that.

00:25:25.840 --> 00:25:29.976
Working with a translator
will be needed.

00:25:30.000 --> 00:25:33.360
But the most important thing that
I want to say about the cultural setting is

00:25:33.360 --> 00:25:36.880
to make sure that we all recognize that
the local partner should be the key for

00:25:36.880 --> 00:25:40.880
communicating the messages out.
And so we’re providing them with the

00:25:40.880 --> 00:25:43.520
expertise, and they’re making the
decisions, and we should leave the

00:25:43.520 --> 00:25:46.400
communications to them rather
than us taking the lead and saying,

00:25:46.400 --> 00:25:48.960
here’s what I think
about the hazard.

00:25:48.960 --> 00:25:53.900
So sensitivity to all those
things is also critical.

00:25:56.160 --> 00:26:00.777
Okay, those are factors that
go into landslide response.

00:26:01.520 --> 00:26:04.480
What are the types of landslide
responses that we do?

00:26:04.480 --> 00:26:10.720
And so I hit on this earlier.
What I’ve done is I’ve looked at all the

00:26:10.720 --> 00:26:17.760
responses that I put into this proceedings
paper that we had put together and was

00:26:17.760 --> 00:26:23.360
able to see that they could fit into these
three categories – providing past

00:26:23.360 --> 00:26:28.296
context, addressing the present hazards,
and improving future assessments.

00:26:28.320 --> 00:26:32.560
And, again, I do want to recognize
all my co-authors on this.

00:26:32.560 --> 00:26:37.760
I worked particularly closely with Mark
Reid to come up with this framework.

00:26:37.760 --> 00:26:42.536
And I think it fits really
well for what we do.

00:26:42.560 --> 00:26:47.360
And so, when we’re looking at the past
context, what we’re doing here is

00:26:47.360 --> 00:26:51.520
we’re asking, what do past events
tell us about the current disaster?

00:26:51.520 --> 00:26:55.360
What can we provide?
What expertise do we know about from,

00:26:55.360 --> 00:26:59.520
you know, having some experience with
previous events that we can provide to

00:26:59.520 --> 00:27:03.976
the emergency managers at that time
to deal with the current situation?

00:27:04.000 --> 00:27:08.240
Addressing the present hazards is really
dealing with, what do we need to do

00:27:08.240 --> 00:27:14.216
now? What needs to be done to
mitigate this current situation?

00:27:14.240 --> 00:27:17.840
And then looking at the future
assessments is really, what can we

00:27:17.840 --> 00:27:22.456
learn now in order to prevent something
like this from happening again?

00:27:22.480 --> 00:27:27.816
And so the tools that
we might use are many.

00:27:27.840 --> 00:27:30.640
We’re going to be answering questions,
obviously, but we might be mapping,

00:27:30.640 --> 00:27:34.080
we might be performing some modeling,
we might be installing monitoring

00:27:34.080 --> 00:27:38.240
equipment, collecting data, information
mining from historical accounts.

00:27:38.240 --> 00:27:43.572
So all of these things
go into that kind of response.

00:27:45.040 --> 00:27:48.960
So taking everything into consideration
here, I’m going to step through three

00:27:48.960 --> 00:27:52.240
case studies, one that highlights
the past, the present, and the future –

00:27:52.240 --> 00:27:54.936
those three different
landslide categories.

00:27:54.960 --> 00:27:58.080
And I’ll describe each event,
and then we’ll talk about –

00:27:58.080 --> 00:28:02.936
I’ll provide some details on some of
the lessons learned from those events.

00:28:02.960 --> 00:28:07.280
And so we already – I already
highlighted these two Sausalito

00:28:07.280 --> 00:28:10.960
and Yosemite events.
And so now I’ll focus on these

00:28:10.960 --> 00:28:17.360
next three – Oso, Washington in 2014;
a 2005 La Conchita landslide in

00:28:17.360 --> 00:28:20.880
southern California; and then,
for the future perspective,

00:28:20.880 --> 00:28:25.520
looking at what we’re learning now
about landslides in Glacier Bay and

00:28:25.520 --> 00:28:30.638
coastal Alaska to inform on
potential hazards in the future.

00:28:31.840 --> 00:28:35.680
So we’ll start looking backwards.
We’ll look to the past.

00:28:35.680 --> 00:28:40.320
And, you know, I’ve mentioned
some of this information before,

00:28:40.320 --> 00:28:43.656
but I’ll highlight it here
because I think it’s important.

00:28:43.680 --> 00:28:47.920
Those first responders, again, might not
have any experience with landslides.

00:28:47.920 --> 00:28:50.216
They might not know
what they’re dealing with.

00:28:50.240 --> 00:28:55.040
And so that’s our cue to
get involved and to provide them

00:28:55.040 --> 00:28:57.760
with that kind of expertise
and those answers.

00:28:57.760 --> 00:29:01.120
So just answering simple questions.
What is this event?

00:29:01.120 --> 00:29:04.456
It’s a landslide. It’s a debris flow.
It’s a rockfall.

00:29:04.480 --> 00:29:07.656
We’ve had these
here before.

00:29:07.680 --> 00:29:09.760
You know, here’s how
they’ve been dealt with.

00:29:09.760 --> 00:29:14.616
Here’s how they’ve
evolved over time.

00:29:14.640 --> 00:29:16.560
But we can answer
those questions.

00:29:16.560 --> 00:29:20.696
We can provide that information,
in a lot of cases.

00:29:20.720 --> 00:29:23.520
So we’ll look at the La Conchita
landslide in southern California

00:29:23.520 --> 00:29:28.240
from 2005 as an example
of looking towards the past

00:29:28.240 --> 00:29:30.776
to help inform the
current situation.

00:29:30.800 --> 00:29:36.720
La Conchita is a small coastal
community built at the base of

00:29:36.720 --> 00:29:42.000
a 180-meter-tall coastal terrace
formed of weak sedimentary units.

00:29:42.000 --> 00:29:46.640
And, in this case, the landslide
occurred from above-average

00:29:46.640 --> 00:29:50.240
precipitation in that year.
There were two events in this

00:29:50.240 --> 00:29:54.680
community about 10 years apart.
In 1995, and you can see the outline

00:29:54.680 --> 00:29:58.880
in green here in the image,
there was a slow-moving complex

00:29:58.880 --> 00:30:03.600
slump that led to some homes
being damaged but no fatalities.

00:30:03.600 --> 00:30:06.160
So the landslide moved slow
enough that people were able to

00:30:06.160 --> 00:30:08.720
get out of the way.
And you can see that it didn’t really

00:30:08.720 --> 00:30:12.616
make it down into the community
too far, just on the edge.

00:30:12.640 --> 00:30:19.429
Unfortunately, in 2005, 10 years later,
part of this debris of the scarp

00:30:19.429 --> 00:30:25.416
remobilized into a rapid debris flow, and 
36 homes were damaged with 10 fatalities.

00:30:25.440 --> 00:30:29.816
And you can see here the outline
in yellow where that went.

00:30:29.840 --> 00:30:32.480
So you can see that, obviously –
and I’m going to talk about the

00:30:32.480 --> 00:30:38.640
2005 event, but you can see that
the value of having an understanding

00:30:38.640 --> 00:30:43.016
and experience with the
1990 event was going to be critical.

00:30:43.040 --> 00:30:48.720
In the initial hours of the event, after the
event, that’s the emergency responders.

00:30:48.720 --> 00:30:52.456
In this case, there was a local
government geologist that was able to

00:30:52.480 --> 00:30:56.880
get to the scene very quickly and do
those rescue operations, assess the

00:30:56.880 --> 00:31:03.256
immediate life safety, set up perimeters.
In the following days, state and federal

00:31:03.280 --> 00:31:08.000
partners, including the USGS,
got involved. And their role was

00:31:08.000 --> 00:31:12.640
to answer questions, obviously,
and to provide that background.

00:31:12.640 --> 00:31:16.400
They also provided hazard
assessment and, again, the goal was

00:31:16.400 --> 00:31:19.120
that decision-making with
the best available information.

00:31:19.120 --> 00:31:24.880
So, you know, giving the emergency
managers, the decision-makers,

00:31:24.880 --> 00:31:31.200
the ability to make that decision to
open up or close a road or, you know,

00:31:31.200 --> 00:31:34.240
keep a perimeter line or allow
people back into their homes

00:31:34.240 --> 00:31:37.336
to retrieve their possessions,
things like this.

00:31:37.360 --> 00:31:39.280
I’m sure the question,
what’s the likelihood

00:31:39.280 --> 00:31:42.750
of additional activation,
was being asked.

00:31:44.480 --> 00:31:48.400
I’m not going to go into the details
that I did for the Sausalito and Yosemite

00:31:48.400 --> 00:31:52.480
event in terms of what exactly they did.
Rather, for these next three case studies,

00:31:52.480 --> 00:31:54.800
I’m going to just talk
about the lessons learned.

00:31:54.800 --> 00:31:58.560
But I will say, if anybody’s interested
in the details for that, we do have

00:31:58.560 --> 00:32:02.160
this proceedings paper available.
I’ll put up the URL at the end from the

00:32:02.160 --> 00:32:05.576
World Landslide Forum
this past year.

00:32:05.600 --> 00:32:11.976
Lessons learned for the
La Conchita slide, really many.

00:32:12.000 --> 00:32:16.400
I talked with Randy Jibson about
this considerably, and, you know,

00:32:16.400 --> 00:32:19.816
he was the one that was involved
heavily in this response.

00:32:19.840 --> 00:32:23.520
Among the most important lessons
learned was the importance of rapidly

00:32:23.520 --> 00:32:27.576
sharing the objective findings with
all the parties all at the same time.

00:32:27.600 --> 00:32:31.576
So, you know,
emotions were running high.

00:32:31.600 --> 00:32:35.280
Some people probably felt that,
you know, the community

00:32:35.280 --> 00:32:39.360
shouldn’t be there anymore.
Some people felt that the community

00:32:39.360 --> 00:32:41.840
should absolutely be there,
and they’re going to rebuild exactly

00:32:41.840 --> 00:32:44.960
where those homes were.
Lots of different opinions.

00:32:44.960 --> 00:32:48.320
Lots of different emotions.
And so getting involved in that,

00:32:48.320 --> 00:32:53.280
and talking to one person and then
another person might get you into

00:32:53.280 --> 00:32:57.120
trouble, essentially. And so,
you know, just sticking to the facts

00:32:57.120 --> 00:33:02.560
and disseminating that knowledge to
everybody equally is really critical

00:33:02.560 --> 00:33:08.696
to be able to provide
that information objectively.

00:33:08.720 --> 00:33:13.656
In this case, because there was
such a strong local feeling to that,

00:33:13.680 --> 00:33:17.120
one of the lessons learned here
was that the use of a non-local

00:33:17.120 --> 00:33:20.240
expert was helpful.
Somebody that could come in

00:33:20.240 --> 00:33:26.776
and say, hey, I don’t have any –
I don’t have any situation here

00:33:26.800 --> 00:33:30.480
personally or from a agency.
I’m just going to tell you how

00:33:30.480 --> 00:33:34.536
this looks to a landslide expert
that has dealt with this before.

00:33:34.560 --> 00:33:36.856
And so that
was helpful.

00:33:36.880 --> 00:33:41.840
A couple other lessons learned from
this were dealing with sort of the

00:33:41.840 --> 00:33:46.720
media and legal implications.
And so, because this landslide led to

00:33:46.720 --> 00:33:53.016
lawsuits and lots of fingers being
pointed and things like that,

00:33:53.040 --> 00:33:58.696
it was very important to exercise
prudence when talking to the media,

00:33:58.720 --> 00:34:02.160
to stick to the facts.
The media might ask questions

00:34:02.160 --> 00:34:04.800
such as, would you have
built your home here?

00:34:04.800 --> 00:34:09.976
Or, would you rebuild your home here?
And that’s not ours to answer.

00:34:10.000 --> 00:34:13.760
You know, ours – the questions that
we can answer is, what’s the

00:34:13.760 --> 00:34:19.096
immediate risk, what’s the hazard.
Stick to the facts,

00:34:19.120 --> 00:34:23.336
not your own personal
opinions about the situation.

00:34:23.360 --> 00:34:26.720
And then, you know, again,
the legal and political issues

00:34:26.720 --> 00:34:30.320
that would come out of something like
that, those kind of questions being asked

00:34:30.320 --> 00:34:36.570
and being aware of that situation’s
always really, really important.

00:34:38.480 --> 00:34:42.480
Okay, I’ll move on to the next
case study, which addresses

00:34:42.480 --> 00:34:45.600
the present hazards situation.
For this, I’m going to return

00:34:45.600 --> 00:34:50.456
back to the Oso, Washington,
landslide from 2014.

00:34:50.480 --> 00:34:55.120
Here we’re going to be asking
questions about what’s the situation

00:34:55.120 --> 00:34:59.360
now, and how do we deal with it?
Is it safe to conduct rescue and recovery

00:34:59.360 --> 00:35:03.656
missions? What’s the short-
and long-term expected hazard?

00:35:03.680 --> 00:35:04.960
Can we re-open these roads?

00:35:04.960 --> 00:35:08.516
Can we allow occupants
back into their homes?

00:35:10.560 --> 00:35:14.560
So, as I mentioned, Oso,
this was a landslide in 2014,

00:35:14.560 --> 00:35:17.419
northwest Washington.

00:35:18.640 --> 00:35:23.280
And the community is called the
Steelhead Haven community.

00:35:23.280 --> 00:35:27.440
It’s actually not in the town of Oso.
Oso is located to the west a little ways,

00:35:27.440 --> 00:35:32.640
but the closest town has been named,
or the landslide’s been named

00:35:32.640 --> 00:35:36.616
after the closest town,
so we call it the Oso landslide.

00:35:36.640 --> 00:35:39.600
This community here was built
on the banks of the North Fork

00:35:39.600 --> 00:35:43.600
Stillaguamish River.
There’s a 180-meter fluvial terrace

00:35:43.600 --> 00:35:46.616
in back of it.
You can see here, it failed.

00:35:46.640 --> 00:35:52.000
These are composed of glacial deposits,
and again, this, similar to La Conchita,

00:35:52.000 --> 00:35:55.256
failed in an above-average
precipitation year.

00:35:55.280 --> 00:35:59.040
Also similar to La Conchita, there were
multiple events, and here they were

00:35:59.040 --> 00:36:05.816
eight years apart. In 2006, this slope
failed as a slow-moving slump.

00:36:05.840 --> 00:36:07.680
No homes damaged.
No fatalities.

00:36:07.680 --> 00:36:12.818
The river was partially blocked
but then was able to re-route itself,

00:36:12.818 --> 00:36:14.616
reclaim its channel.

00:36:14.640 --> 00:36:18.720
Unfortunately, eight years later,
this landslide failed in a rapid

00:36:18.720 --> 00:36:22.160
debris flow avalanche,
and 50 homes were destroyed –

00:36:22.160 --> 00:36:27.343
essentially the entire community,
resulting in 43 fatalities.

00:36:28.400 --> 00:36:31.840
So the initial response, again,
was by the emergency responders.

00:36:31.840 --> 00:36:36.160
And, again, in this case, similar to
La Conchita, the local government

00:36:36.160 --> 00:36:39.360
geologists were able to get to the
scene really quickly and start

00:36:39.360 --> 00:36:44.696
assessing what needed to be done.
This was all focused on rescue,

00:36:44.720 --> 00:36:49.840
pulling people from the debris.
In the days and weeks that followed,

00:36:49.840 --> 00:36:54.720
this then switched over
to a recovery effort.

00:36:54.720 --> 00:37:01.280
The decision had been made to recover
the bodies of all the people who died

00:37:01.280 --> 00:37:06.720
in the landslide, and so this really led to
a much larger effort of having hundreds

00:37:06.720 --> 00:37:12.240
of search-and-rescue people working
at the distal end of the landslide.

00:37:12.240 --> 00:37:17.200
And so that was a call for landslide
experts, USGS involvement,

00:37:17.200 --> 00:37:21.360
and others to assess the ongoing
hazard potential to protect and to give

00:37:21.360 --> 00:37:28.855
warning to those recovery operations.
This included installing instrumentation

00:37:28.880 --> 00:37:33.656
and monitoring during the
search-and-rescue operations.

00:37:33.680 --> 00:37:37.120
There’s a lot of details that
went into this response

00:37:37.120 --> 00:37:39.760
I’m not going to cover here.
As I mentioned, I’m just going to sort of

00:37:39.760 --> 00:37:42.880
hit the highlights of the lesson learned,
but for those interested in this event,

00:37:42.880 --> 00:37:47.040
there’s a new paper that Mark Reid led.
It was published last year.

00:37:47.040 --> 00:37:50.480
It’s called When Hazard Avoidance
is Not an Option, Lessons Learned

00:37:50.480 --> 00:37:52.933
from Monitoring the
Post-Disaster Oso Landslide.

00:37:52.933 --> 00:37:57.200
And that’s in Landslides Journal.
So I would invite anybody interested

00:37:57.200 --> 00:38:02.216
in learning more details about
that response to visit that paper.

00:38:02.240 --> 00:38:08.536
The lessons learned from this event.
One critical thing is understanding,

00:38:08.560 --> 00:38:12.080
you know, just how many people
you might end up talking to for this.

00:38:12.080 --> 00:38:17.760
This was a very large event with lots of
moving parts, lots of different agencies,

00:38:17.760 --> 00:38:22.480
and being able to establish trust
with the representatives of all those

00:38:22.480 --> 00:38:27.360
agencies in the thick of
the response can be difficult.

00:38:27.360 --> 00:38:33.600
So, as much as possible, a lesson learned
is just to use opportunities to build those

00:38:33.600 --> 00:38:37.896
relationships before something happens.
And if that means, you know,

00:38:37.920 --> 00:38:43.576
participating in this seminar and,
you know, getting to know some people,

00:38:43.600 --> 00:38:48.405
that can be of tremendous
value at some point in the future.

00:38:49.760 --> 00:38:54.480
One thing we learned from this
was the value of having available

00:38:54.480 --> 00:38:58.640
monitoring instrumentation and the
expertise that goes along with it.

00:38:58.640 --> 00:39:02.800
It’s not just the hardware, but it’s the
people behind that that understand

00:39:02.800 --> 00:39:07.736
these systems and being able
to rapidly deploy these things.

00:39:07.760 --> 00:39:13.440
Here we put out seismometers and
GPS receivers, and there was a lot of

00:39:13.440 --> 00:39:17.360
expertise that was already in-house
for that, and it was fortuitous that

00:39:17.360 --> 00:39:23.096
we had some of those – some of that
instrumentation ready to go at the time.

00:39:23.120 --> 00:39:26.160
More importantly, as I mentioned,
we had the expertise behind them that

00:39:26.160 --> 00:39:31.040
could sort of coach the people that were
involved in the response to be able to

00:39:31.040 --> 00:39:35.680
use this effectively and provide those
timely warnings in case something was

00:39:35.680 --> 00:39:40.321
going to – in case instrumentation was
showing that something could happen.

00:39:40.960 --> 00:39:45.200
Another key item here is being
able to adapt our technology.

00:39:45.200 --> 00:39:48.000
So a lot of us are in the
landslide research community.

00:39:48.000 --> 00:39:52.056
We use these tools,
but they’re for research.

00:39:52.080 --> 00:39:58.000
We’re not often asked to make a
decision or provide some interpretation

00:39:58.000 --> 00:40:05.360
of the data in the next 15 minutes.
And that’s kind of the operational side

00:40:05.360 --> 00:40:08.800
of things is when you’re being
able to adapt what you do

00:40:08.800 --> 00:40:11.680
in research to in
operations is difficult.

00:40:11.680 --> 00:40:15.336
And so being aware that
you might be asked to do that.

00:40:15.360 --> 00:40:20.480
And then obviously, along with that
goes uncertainty and, as much as you

00:40:20.480 --> 00:40:26.080
can, being comfortable with uncertainty
or being able to wrap your head

00:40:26.080 --> 00:40:28.480
around uncertainty
is really important.

00:40:28.480 --> 00:40:33.107
So that’s another lesson learned
for dealing with responses.

00:40:34.080 --> 00:40:39.280
Okay, the final case study I’ll go into
is looking at the future and what can

00:40:39.280 --> 00:40:44.776
we learn from an event now to
help us inform what might happen.

00:40:44.800 --> 00:40:49.120
And so I’m going to turn to
a case study from coastal Alaska.

00:40:49.120 --> 00:40:52.800
This is one that Jeff Coe’s
been involved with a lot.

00:40:52.800 --> 00:40:56.880
This is going to be looking at
data collection and long-term

00:40:56.880 --> 00:41:04.677
monitoring of some landslides
in Glacier Bay, Alaska.

00:41:09.040 --> 00:41:13.840
And so – and I should say Glacier Bay,
but we’ve actually started working in

00:41:13.840 --> 00:41:19.200
Prince William Sound as well,
and so these landslides that we’re

00:41:19.200 --> 00:41:24.696
looking at are related in some respect
in that they all have the potential

00:41:24.720 --> 00:41:30.960
to cause tsunamis, and these could
affect local communities and

00:41:30.960 --> 00:41:34.160
shipping traffic in
this area of Alaska.

00:41:34.160 --> 00:41:38.480
We’re dealing with landslides that
are potentially millions, hundreds of

00:41:38.480 --> 00:41:43.280
millions, of cubic meters in size,
potentially being destabilized from

00:41:43.280 --> 00:41:48.480
deglaciation and climate change effects.
We don’t know how many events are

00:41:48.480 --> 00:41:51.520
out there. We don’t necessarily know
where they might occur next, but we

00:41:51.520 --> 00:41:55.360
do know where some of them are.
And so this is really saying, what can

00:41:55.360 --> 00:41:59.600
we learn from those ones that we know
about to help us inform how we might

00:41:59.600 --> 00:42:05.176
go about dealing with any
potential disaster from the future.

00:42:05.200 --> 00:42:09.520
And so what Jeff and his team
did in Glacier Bay was looked at

00:42:09.520 --> 00:42:13.736
a series of 10 landslides that occurred
over about a four-year period.

00:42:13.760 --> 00:42:18.400
And looked at the effects of
temperature change on those

00:42:18.400 --> 00:42:21.600
and then also just getting
a handle on what are the sizes

00:42:21.600 --> 00:42:26.696
of those landslides and what’s
their potential for runout.

00:42:26.720 --> 00:42:31.680
In 2021, last year, we got involved in a
large landslide in Prince William Sound,

00:42:31.680 --> 00:42:36.240
the Barry Arm landslide. Again,
this is a disaster that hasn’t happened.

00:42:36.240 --> 00:42:40.400
It obviously has the potential.
And so, you know, we’re doing

00:42:40.400 --> 00:42:44.320
everything we can now to
prevent and to be prepared

00:42:44.320 --> 00:42:48.536
for things that might
happen in the future.

00:42:48.560 --> 00:42:54.000
So response in this case is a little
slower speed compared to maybe some

00:42:54.000 --> 00:43:00.000
of the other case studies I’ve described.
Here we’re really looking at

00:43:00.000 --> 00:43:04.400
a lot of data. We’re analyzing
satellite imagery. We might be

00:43:04.400 --> 00:43:08.000
looking at climate data, looking at
potential temperature trends,

00:43:08.000 --> 00:43:12.560
thresholds, and evaluating some
of the instabilities that have not

00:43:12.560 --> 00:43:17.280
fully re-activated, or have not
activated into a full-scale landslide

00:43:17.280 --> 00:43:22.696
potential disaster. So monitoring,
modeling, things like that.

00:43:22.720 --> 00:43:25.840
What are some lessons learned
from this – from this sort of

00:43:25.840 --> 00:43:30.320
forward-looking perspective?
The use of archived remote sensing

00:43:30.320 --> 00:43:35.016
imagery is critical. I mean,
having these baseline data sets

00:43:35.040 --> 00:43:40.456
really will help inform us to be
prepared for something in the future.

00:43:40.480 --> 00:43:44.240
Being able to proactively recognize
hazards and instability, having that

00:43:44.240 --> 00:43:49.600
trained eye with those archived
data resources, gives us that

00:43:49.600 --> 00:43:55.840
ability to hopefully plan.
And, you know, in this case,

00:43:55.840 --> 00:43:59.600
we have a lot of landslides that were
documented that were non-damaging.

00:43:59.600 --> 00:44:02.407
They weren’t
landslide disasters.

00:44:03.200 --> 00:44:07.520
But using that information effectively
to help prepare for something that

00:44:07.520 --> 00:44:12.080
could happen is really the key.
And one thing we’re learning again that,

00:44:12.080 --> 00:44:15.680
you know, I highlighted in the Oso case
study was that scientific partnering.

00:44:15.680 --> 00:44:19.680
Being able to make those relationships
with all of the other key players,

00:44:19.680 --> 00:44:23.729
having those opens forms of
communication is critical.

00:44:24.880 --> 00:44:29.680
So a quick summary, I guess,
in terms of the progress that we’ve

00:44:29.680 --> 00:44:34.960
made in responding to landslide 
disasters. Preparation is key.

00:44:34.960 --> 00:44:38.480
I’ve hit on this in a
number of the case studies.

00:44:38.480 --> 00:44:42.696
Having ready-to-deploy data
collection methods, instrumentation,

00:44:42.720 --> 00:44:48.480
using archived imagery.
Having these baseline Lidar data sets

00:44:48.480 --> 00:44:55.360
or imagery data sets is critical.
Adapting new types of technology.

00:44:55.360 --> 00:45:00.320
So being able to rapidly conduct
satellite tasking using the latest

00:45:00.320 --> 00:45:07.896
infrasound or seismic methods. Having
all those key skills will be important.

00:45:07.920 --> 00:45:12.456
And I’ll highlight this third bullet again
on the next slide, but communication.

00:45:12.480 --> 00:45:18.000
Being able to really have those
relationships established,

00:45:18.000 --> 00:45:22.640
or cultivate them quickly, and be able to
provide those messages really on a

00:45:22.640 --> 00:45:27.440
timely fact-supported basis is critical.
Having those skills –

00:45:27.440 --> 00:45:33.176
those communication skills
ahead of time is really helpful.

00:45:33.200 --> 00:45:37.120
And, you know, a general experience
in talking to all the co-authors for this

00:45:37.120 --> 00:45:40.640
paper, all the people that have
responded to this, technologies

00:45:40.640 --> 00:45:43.600
are great. They’re obviously
changing the way we do things.

00:45:43.600 --> 00:45:48.320
But there’s really no substitute for
being on the ground and being able to

00:45:48.320 --> 00:45:52.320
talk with that emergency manager
one-on-one or, you know, in person to

00:45:52.320 --> 00:45:56.480
understand what they’re dealing with.
So that is something that really hasn’t

00:45:56.480 --> 00:45:59.840
changed is that interpersonal
communication skill and being

00:45:59.840 --> 00:46:03.685
able to wrap your head around
the same situation that they are.

00:46:04.880 --> 00:46:09.680
So, as I mentioned,
communication is key for all of this.

00:46:09.680 --> 00:46:15.720
And I’ve taken these bullet points from
a presentation that Stephen Slaughter

00:46:15.720 --> 00:46:19.600
has put together about communication
for geologic emergencies.

00:46:19.600 --> 00:46:22.320
Distilling your message
down into plain language.

00:46:22.320 --> 00:46:25.280
Keeping the message simple and
memorable – something that they

00:46:25.280 --> 00:46:29.120
remember once they’ve left you
and moved on to the next thing.

00:46:29.120 --> 00:46:31.840
And then obviously, you know,
if they come back to you,

00:46:31.840 --> 00:46:35.840
having that consistent repeatable
message to reinforce what it is that

00:46:35.840 --> 00:46:39.360
you find is the most important aspects
that they need to walk away with.

00:46:39.360 --> 00:46:42.960
Being able to have those skills,
those communication,

00:46:42.960 --> 00:46:45.656
is really the key
for all of this.

00:46:45.680 --> 00:46:51.440
I highlighted here a figure taken from
a paper that Rick Wooten had put

00:46:51.440 --> 00:46:56.000
together for the North American
Landslide Conference back in 2017.

00:46:56.000 --> 00:46:58.000
And I thought this
was really interesting.

00:46:58.000 --> 00:47:01.120
This is the North Carolina Geological
Survey’s Landslide Response

00:47:01.120 --> 00:47:04.080
Activity Framework.
Lots of different bullets, but you can

00:47:04.080 --> 00:47:07.440
see about 25% of those bullets have
something to do with communication,

00:47:07.440 --> 00:47:11.680
whether it’s providing media briefings
or, you know, providing information

00:47:11.680 --> 00:47:15.120
to those people that are going
to do those media briefings.

00:47:15.120 --> 00:47:18.456
Communicating with emergency
management people.

00:47:18.480 --> 00:47:19.977
Talking with
stakeholders.

00:47:19.977 --> 00:47:24.954
So communication is always critical,
always a key for all of this.

00:47:26.080 --> 00:47:33.600
So I’ll sum up a few conclusions.
In the end, what we have determined is

00:47:33.600 --> 00:47:38.800
that the core job is actually quite simple.
It’s being able to communicate the

00:47:38.800 --> 00:47:42.160
fundamentals of landslide science.
It’s taking what you know as a landslide

00:47:42.160 --> 00:47:46.800
expert and being able to share that
message and get that message across

00:47:46.800 --> 00:47:50.936
to the emergency managers,
the decision-makers that than have to

00:47:50.960 --> 00:47:54.311
move on and deal
with the situation.

00:47:55.600 --> 00:47:57.360
Unfortunately,
you know, it’s a fact.

00:47:57.360 --> 00:48:02.456
The number and severity of the
landslide disasters is likely to increase.

00:48:02.480 --> 00:48:06.376
You know, our society continues
to build into steeper areas.

00:48:06.400 --> 00:48:11.280
And, you know, I can’t say that,
despite all of our efforts in hazard

00:48:11.280 --> 00:48:15.040
prevention, that we won’t be faced
with another landslide disaster.

00:48:15.040 --> 00:48:18.400
And so, as I mentioned,
that’s the motivation behind this

00:48:18.400 --> 00:48:23.496
is to let us think about that
to help us get prepared for that.

00:48:23.520 --> 00:48:29.040
And so, again, this was the USGS
perspective from all of our case studies,

00:48:29.040 --> 00:48:35.520
but the point is really to open up those
avenues of communication, and this is

00:48:35.520 --> 00:48:39.920
a invitation to share your
own experiences and develop

00:48:39.920 --> 00:48:46.075
those relationships, if need be,
prior to a disaster happening.

00:48:47.280 --> 00:48:50.880
So that’s all I have for today.
Here’s the URL for the paper that

00:48:50.880 --> 00:48:55.656
I mentioned that’s published in the
World Landslide Forum on this –

00:48:55.680 --> 00:48:58.560
dealing with the
landslide disaster response.

00:48:58.560 --> 00:49:03.120
And I’ve also put up the reference
for Rick Wooten’s paper about

00:49:03.120 --> 00:49:05.360
the North Carolina
Geological Survey’s experience.

00:49:05.360 --> 00:49:12.400
So I’ll leave that up there for a sec,
and that’s all I have. Matt, let me know

00:49:12.400 --> 00:49:18.617
if I should keep this up or stop sharing
or what happens next. Thanks.

00:49:20.015 --> 00:49:26.789
[silence]